Довгалюк Тарас Metamemory perspectives of identification on haptic patterns naming

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Основна мета теоретичного дослідження полягала у визначенні характеристик утворення метакогнітивних суджень підчас ідентифікації тактильних патернів. У даній статті розглянуто процеси сприймання, ідентифікації та найменування тактильних патернів. Визначено особливості сприймання форми та властивостей поверхні, внутрішні та зовнішні детермінанти процесу ідентифікації тактильних об’єктів, феномен метапам’яті, ретроспективні судження впевненості (retrospective confidence judgments) та судження про відчуття знання (feeling of knowing judgments) у процес ідентифікації.


Ключові слова: Тактильний номінативний процес, тактильна ідентифікація, метапам’ять, метакогнітивні судження, судження ретроспективної впевненості, судження про відчуття знання, властивості патерну, точність

Key words: haptic naming process, haptic identification, metamemory, metacognitive judgments, retrospective confidence judgments, feeling of knowing judgments, patern properties, accuracy

The naming process includes three broad stages:  object identification, name activation and response generation. Firstly, object identification have place when person identifies object as a member of a particular class of objects; secondary, appropriate names stored in memory are activating, to which this object is similar; next stage entails the articulation of one of these names as an overt response. Mentioned stages are usually assumed to occur sequentially, because an object can be recognized without its name being activated, and a name can be activated without it being overtly responded. This is in contrast to the object identification stage which is obligatory, that is, recognition of a familiar object cannot be prevented (Jonsson, 2005).

The underlying assumption is that if a person is able to name something, then he or she normally also knows what it is, that is, have identified the item in question. However, an object can be identified by other means than by the proper name and an object can be identified even though its name is sometimes not retrieved or even learned (Jonsson, 2005). A haptic example could be if the participant discovers sandpaper and able to imagine how the item looks, the material on which it made from and or knows where it can be used and so forth. Although, haptic identification might be uses analogously to haptic naming. The haptic identification process starting from haptic perception, matching with previous experience and response generation. Previously, we review the process of haptic perception, perhaps, major of these ones.

The term haptic perception refers to tactual perception in which both the cutaneous sense and kinesthesis convey have significant information about distal objects and events. Most of our everyday tactual perception and tactually controlled performance falls into this category. In our further experiment we will examine the naming process of tactile patterns where participants will be identify matter (e.g. glass, foam plastic or wooden) of particular  pattern that includes perception of shape, form, structure of surface, properties of object (density, temperature, weight).

The informal term for a sensory system included in haptic is named as «Touch». Representations making sense in one domain would be foreign to other and many of creatures of other domains (like vision, hearing or olfactory) should have no equivalent in touch (Artheim, 1990). The touch is the proximal and people depicting surface immediately (Henriques, 2003; Kennedy, 2000). Using the proximal, touch operates across time to discover the distal relations between objects. Touch involves point of contrast changing across time and a point of outreach, a base from which exploratory movements are made. We are discovering directions of things from many vantage points that include the directions of objects from each other.

Only a fraction of surface is touched in any instant, but what haptic registers are the surfaces of their size and orientation (large or small patterns). The border between what faces a vantage point and what does not often quite precise, as in the case of corners of a cube. An undulating surface that we feel in an extended movement occupies a set of directions from our location at any given moment. This set of directions is part of the group of impressions of the corrugated distal surface stretching away from us (Kennedy, 2000).

Theory of the relation between touch, attention and motor control holds that touch is part of a system that incorporates modulation in sensitivity due to predictable inputs from active motion, and modulation of input across time due to movement of the stimulus (Chapman, 1994).

Touch begins with pressure variations, related to postural information. And it also yields impressions of surfaces. Touch deals with edges, slant and depth, providing percepts of surfaces and their borders. If touch’s’ products in perception imply an observer, they also imply projection of some kind of object (Kennedy and Bai, 2002).

The change in distance from vantage point to further points means a difference in the relative directions of two or more objects, with angular subtense shrinking, such as the left and right sides lessens with distance of top of a cube.

Perspective patterns on the surface may influence attempts to detect the actual lines on the surface. More front, near, salient lines or items might prevent perception of more distant, inexpressible, but in some cases it provides perception of depth. In perception of depth touch is likely able to emphasize direction.

In human sensing and manipulation of everyday objects, the perception of surface texture is fundamental to accurate identification of an object. Haptic texture information can both increase the sense of realism of an object as well as convey informational content regarding what the object is, where it is, what it is for and so on (Katz, 1989).

We can sense shapes and surface qualities such as compliance and texture not by touch alone, but by correlating tactile sensations with kinesthetic cues resulting from active, exploratory movements of arm and hand. As this brief synopsis implies, haptic sense involves the integration of a variety of somatosensory afferent information with efferent signals, and, most likely, cognitive factors as well. Haptic perception is a complex process but ultimately it relies in large part on geometric information provided by kinesthetic and tactile cues (McGee et al., 2000).

A first level of processing haptic information relates to psychophysical (or sensorial) judgments, perhaps related to appraisal as a precursor to emotion (i.e. Desmet, 2007). Subsequently these judgments pass to other areas of the brain where they are combined, and later may also be compared to memories and create affective judgments (Kringelbach, 2005). The first link of this chain is a relationships between person’s touch perception and the combination of tactile texture and physical properties.

Texture perception is mediated by force cues created by spatial geometry of the surface, also possible that surface texture perception uses vibratory  cues generated by the repeated and regular stimulation of mechanoreceptive afferents as the finger is moved across a surface (Katz, 1989).  In fact, it is possible that both kinds of cues are involved, depending on the task to be executed (Weisenberger and Krier, 1997). The physical properties of textures are very complex and are proving difficult to reproduce for virtual textures (Lederman, 1974).

In our experiment we may observe how perceiver probably will find information about figure-ground relations, orientation, occlusion, the observer’s vantage point, and three-dimensionality in haptic objects and it might be very difficult to appreciate. The tracery and lines might seem highly ambiguous since outline can have several figure-ground effects, standing for occluding edges of curved and flat surfaces, as well as convex and concave corners, and cracks. Perceivers might have trouble integrating information and impression across each feature of pattern (e.g. borders of a surface, lines, shape). People might judge any haptic pattern as unsatisfactory, by the high standards our vision has given us. They might have high identification rates only a few features at most, such as some rough proportions of some selected parts, might be used in support of an attempted identification (but in reverse case lack of that features might cause problems of identification).

Identifying of the pattern may rely on a few of the features to offer a guess about a possible referent. Someone trying to identify the pattern may use just a few of the features to offer a guess about a possible referent and choose that over many others. Generally, the effectiveness of identification process of matter of object might be passing like in the case of identification of 2-D lined-raised patterns (Hopkins, 2000; Kennedy, 1974; Arnheim, 1990).

But in some cases overall rates in a study can be low, but some patterns may be highly recognizable. While several possibilities may come to mind when exploring a haptic pattern, over time the participant may assess all of features in a haptic pattern, and identifycate that many or all possible referent. People might compare them in future in the perception of form the perceiver could estimate the proportion of features, and use this to decide the likelihood the suggested identification is correct.

Metamemory can be defined as the cognitions a person has about his or her own memory, e.g. confidence in the veracity of a memory. It encompasses the knowledge and cognitive processes  which object in cognition and wich task is to control and verify one’s own cognitive functioning (Houde 2004) Conceptually, metacognition is closely related to consciousness (Roberts & Erdos, 1993) and simply named as cognition about cognition. Nelson and Narens (1990) defined metacognition as consisting of two processes: monitoring and control. Monitoring is the collection of information about one’s own knowledge and performance while control refers to the self-regulation of one’s own behavior, notably is that people monitor whatever information/cognitions that an available to consciousness and based on that information that control their actions.

The current experiment focuses on two types of metamemory judgments about haptic identification and naming, namely Feeling of Knowing judgments (i.e., predictions of the future retrieval or recognition of a currently unrecalled memory) and Retrospective Confidence judgments  in retrieved answers (i.e., how sure a person is that some retrieved information from memory is correct. In experiment monitoring aspect is relative to metamemory judgments, and generally our work is focusing on these judgments, haptic identification and naming processes.

Absolute and relative metamemory accuracy will be investigated in study. Absolute metamemory accuracy rely to exact deviation between a person judgments of the likelihood of correct recall for a particular set of items (patterns) and the actual percentage correct recall or recognitions of this items. There are some under/overconfidence: a person that is more confident than correct is said to be an overconfident and vice-versa. A person who is exactly as confident in his or her answers as actual memory performance (e.g., 50% confident and 50% correct recall) is said to be perfectly calibrated. Exact match between subjective belief in memory performance and actual performance underlie this focus (F. Jonsson, 2005).

The feeling of knowing raises the question of how does a person know that he ‘‘knows’’ the sought-after target in the face of being unable to produce it? Hence, feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments elicited following retrieval failures are moderately valid in predicting the success of retrieving the elusive target or recognizing it from among distractors at some later time, and a subjective index of knowing is diagnostic of actual knowledge despite the dissociation noted above between them (Koriat, 2000). The FOKs has the quality of direct, unmediated experience and is the output of a specialized monitoring mechanism that has direct access to the memory trace of the elusive target.

A common experience is a driving force to bring it to an end by retrieving the sought-for target. Thus, regardless of the origin or validity of the feeling of knowing seems to have motivational consequences: people are likely to spend more effort searching for the answer to a question when they feel that they know it, than when they feel that they do not.  People are influenced by their metacognitive feelings even when they do not know why they have these feelings. The feelings of knowing detect directly the presence and, perhaps, the strength of memory traces (Koriat, 2000). Indeed, FOKs has motivated a direct-access (or trace-access) account of the basis for these feelings (see Nelson et al., 1990). This account assumes the existence of a specialized internal monitor that directly detects the presence of the elusive target in store, and it is this monitor that is consulted in making FOK judgments. This an internal monitor executes a function of saving the time and effort searching for  information  that  is  not  stored  in  memory; provides a simple explanation for the accuracy of FOK judgments in predicting actual memory performance, because both subjective and objective indexes of knowing are assumed to be  affected by the strength of the memory trace. (see,  e.g., Yaniv &  Meyer, 1987).

In the direct-access view, the feeling of knowing is granted a special status, having privileged access to stored information that cannot yet be accessed. Hence, the validity of the feeling of knowing is taken for granted, needing no justification.  But sometimes the partial information retrieved proves to be wrong in retrospect, possibly stemming from ‘‘neighboring’’ targets, rather than from the solicited target. The implicit assumption is that although memory may deliver a ‘‘wrong’’ candidate, the feeling of knowing still has privileged access to the correct target. Thus, intuitive noetic feelings are assumed to have a special status, being self-evidently valid.

In current research we may observe interference phenomenon at identification process, hence competition, substitution of stimuli in haptic identification may cause reducing of FOKs accuracy, possibility of naming item right, increasing identification time, e.g. features of repoussage surface and similar surface of glass (smoothness, similar weight etc.) may cause this problems.

Several cues  have  been  proposed  as determinants  of FOKs, this includes the ease or fluency of processing of a presented item, the familiarity of the cue that serves to probe memory,  the  accessibility  of  pertinent  partial  information  about  a  solicited memory target, and retrieval fluency, that is, the ease with which information is accessed (Koriat, 2000).

In haptic identification ease or fluency of processing may by provided due to a presence in memory great number of object properties (surface features, form temperature, weight), ability of detection first-class and secondary features of pattern. Familiarity of pattern depends of frequency of it perception or lack of haptic identification experience.

People can take advantage of what they can retrieve to make inferences about what they cannot access. Thus, there is no separate monitoring module that has privileged access to information that is not already contained in the output of retrieval. Rather, the cues for the FOK reside in the products of the retrieval process itself. When people try to name some haptic pattern, many blocks of information come to mind, including fragments of the target (properties), semantic attributes (rare designation, semantic interference, Tip of the Tongue phenomenon), episodic information, and a variety of subtle activations emanating from other sources (other modalties). Although such information may not be articulate enough to support an analytic inference, they can still act in concert to produce the subjective feeling that the solicited target is available in memory.

Retrospective confidence refers to the belief a participant has in the veracity of his of her memory. This type of judgment does not like FOKs refer to later retrieval or recognition of some unretrieved memory, but is instead a judgments made about the correctness of already retrieved information. Most memories are associated with a more of less conscious interpretative aspect evaluating the correctness of them. (F. Jonsson, 2005).

Confidence judgments can be made both with respect to predictions, such as weather forecasting (e.g. Murphy & Winkler, 1971) and with respect to concurrent and retrospective tasks.

The correspondence between subjective probability (i.e., a personal assessment of accuracy) and the actual probability of a correct response (i.e., objective or empirical result) provides a measure of calibration. Realism in judgments means that answers assigned a certain confidence value of being correct (e.g. 60% sure) in the long run have the corresponding proportion of correct answers (i.e. 60% correct). Overconfidence means that the level of confidence judgments is higher than the level of their accuracy and vice-versa. And many studies find that most of people are underconfident on sensory and perceptual tasks (Juslin, 1994; Stankov & Crawford, 1997) in their judgments about the accuracy of their memory.. In current experiment we will examine confidence judgments in haptic pattern identification and we may observe phenomenon of underconfidence according to previous researches.



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